We test whether wage growth slows following employer consolidation by examining a decade of hospital mergers. To isolate the eects of changes in concentration due to mergers, we estimate dierence-in-dierences models comparing wage growth in markets with mergers to wage growth in markets without mergers. We nd evidence of reduced wage growth in cases where both (i) the increase in concentration induced by the merger is large and (ii) workers' skills are at least somewhat industry-specic. Following such mergers, annual wage growth is 1.1pp slower for skilled non-health professionals and 1.7pp slower for nursing and pharmacy workers than in markets without mergers. In all other cases, we fail to reject zero wage eects. We argue that the observed patterns are unlikely to be explained by merger-related changes aside from labor market power. Wage growth slowdowns appear to be attenuated in markets with strong labor unions, and we do not observe reduced wage growth after out-of-market mergers that leave employer concentration unchanged. In a simple theoretical framework, we show how integrating negative wage eects can lead to more mergers being opposed by antitrust regulators, even without departing from a consumer welfare standard.
Introduction
Labor market concentration has been advanced as a possible contributor to income inequality and wage stagnation. Recent academic work has documented a negative relationship between labor market concentration and wages (Azar et al. 2017; Benmelech et al. 2018; Rinz 2018) , leading to pressure on antitrust authorities to consider labor monopsony eects in merger review.
1,2 Merger review provides a natural policy lever for curtailing labor market consolidation through established regulatory mechanisms (CEA 2016; Naidu et al. 2018; Hemphill and Rose 2018; Marinescu and Hovenkamp 2018; Krueger and Posner 2018) . However, there is limited direct evidence to suggest that employer mergers meaningfully reduce wage growth. If expanded merger review is a leading proposal for dealing with labor market concentration, then it is important to examine whether actual mergersas opposed to other sources of variation in employer concentrationhave contributed to slower wage growth. Indeed, even if concentration can be shown to causally reduce wages, antitrust authorities are not currently empowered to prosecute high levels of concentration in the absence of a merger or other anticompetitive conduct (Rose 2018 ).
To provide evidence on this question, we examine the eects of hospital mergers between 2000 and 2010 on the wages of hospital workers. We begin by documenting that the negative relationship between concentration and wages found in recent papers replicates in the hospital context, and then turn to an analysis that isolates merger-induced concentration changes. In descriptive aggregate regressions of wages on hospital concentration, we estimate that wages in markets with a HerndahlHirschman index (HHI) of 2,500 are 1 to 4 percent lower than in perfectly competitive markets, even after controlling for labor market (commuting zone) and time (year) xed eects. Of course, this negative association between concentration and wages is consistent with explanations besides labor market power. This creates a challenge in translating these results, and the results of other recent work in this literature, into prescriptions for antitrust policy. For instance, if an employer exits a market due to weakening product demand, such a change will both raise measured employer concentration and sap local labor demand. Either of these forces may reduce wages, and thus separating the eects of employer consolidation from other coincident changes in labor demand is a 1 In September 2017, Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) introduced a Senate bill that would have required antitrust authorities to include labor market considerations in merger review (Hipple 2017) . In October 2018, the Federal Trade Commission held hearings to debate the consideration of labor market power in merger review (Arlington and States 2018) .
2 Hereafter, we refer to monopsony using the more general terminology labor market power. 2 signicant empirical challenge.
Our main analyses therefore directly examine the impact of concentration-increasing mergers on subsequent wage growth. By focusing on merger-induced changes in employer concentration, we isolate the portion of the aggregate relationship between concentration and wages that is most directly related to employer consolidation. In dierence-in-dierences regressions, we compare wage growth in labor markets that experience a concentration-increasing merger to wage growth in labor markets without any merger activity. We examine wage trajectories separately as a function of workers' skill level and the industry specicity of their human capital. We group workers into three categories: unskilled workers whose skills are likely not specic to the hospital industry, such as cafeteria workers; skilled workers in non-medical occupations, such as the employee benets department; and skilled health care professionals, specically nursing and pharmacy workers. We nd varied results depending on (i) the worker category and (ii) the magnitude of the change in concentration caused by the merger, with patterns consistent with theory.
For unskilled workers, we nd no evidence of dierences in wage growth post-merger, irrespective of the change in employer concentration induced by the merger. For the two categories of skilled workers, we nd evidence of reduced wage growth, but only in cases where the concentration increase induced by the merger is large. For the top quartile of concentration-increasing mergers, we estimate that wages are 4.1 percent lower for skilled non-health professionals and 6.3 percent lower for nursing and pharmacy workers than they would have been absent the merger, measured over the four years following the merger. These estimates imply 1.1 percentage point slower annual wage growth for skilled non-health professionals and 1.7 percentage point slower growth for nursing and pharmacy workers, representing wage growth reductions of more than 25 percent of baseline wage growth rates. Moreover, the estimated eects do not appear to be generated by pre-merger dierences in wage trends nor post-merger changes in labor quantity or labor composition. These ndings are consistent with an increase in labor market power dampening wage growth. Wages of unskilled workers, whose eective set of potential employers is likely much broader than hospitals, see no discernible change. Wages of workers whose skills are less transferable to employers outside the hospital industry are adversely aected by mergers, but only when the mergers are large enough to meaningfully aect labor market concentration.
To further explore the consistency of these results with a labor market power mechanism, we estimate several additional specications. First, we examine whether the presence of countervailing worker power attenuates post-merger reductions in wage growth. Estimates using two measures of worker power suggest that they do: both high levels of unionization and a pro-union environment (as measured by the absence of right-to-work laws) appear to mitigate the estimated negative wage eects. Second, we examine whether mergers in and of themselves are likely responsible for the observed wage patterns, outside of their potential wage eects through labor market concentration.
To do so, we examine the wage eects of out-of-market mergers in which the merging hospitals are located in non-overlapping labor markets.
3 These mergers therefore do not aect local labor market concentration. Since we can plausibly rule out labor market power in these cases a priori, any observed wage impacts following such mergers can instead be attributed to alternative nonlabor market power mechanisms. We nd no changes in wage trajectories following out-of-market mergers, irrespective of (i) the worker category and (ii) the pre-existing level of concentration in the market.
We couch our ndings in a simple theoretical framework to explore the implications for merger enforcement. The proper treatment of post-merger cost reductions that are obtained via increased market power is an unsettled question (Carlton and Israel 2011; Berman Jackson 2017; Hemphill and Rose 2018) . In our context, post-merger wage reductions may on one hand be viewed as anticompetitive harm due to the merger. On the other hand, if the wage reductions lead to lower prices, they may instead be viewed as eciencies that are generated by the merger, a completely opposite interpretation of the same phenomenon. What distinguishes wage reductions from other input cost eciencies is that wage reductions have a direct eect on consumer welfare. We show that negative wage eects can in principle be incorporated into merger evaluation without departing from a consumer welfare standard. Because the workers aected by a merger are also consumers, a tightening of their budget constraint due to wage slowdowns decreases their welfare. Accounting for this consumer subgroup may therefore lead to the merger decreasing consumer welfare, even if the merger leads to lower prices. This exercise shows that antitrust authorities need not depart from a consumer welfare standard in order integrate labor market eects into merger review.
On balance, our results suggest that increased employer labor market power via mergers may indeed contribute to wage stagnation, but that such eects may apply in relatively narrow circum-3 Over our sample period of 2000 to 2010, nearly half of all hospital mergers in our data did not involve any commuting zone overlap between the merging parties. 4 stances. Wage growth slows only following mergers that lead to substantial increases in employer concentration, and only for workers whose skills are likely less transferable outside of the industry.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 proposes a framework for incorporating wage eects into merger evaluation. Section 3 connects the paper to the related literature. Section 4 describes our wage and merger data. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
Wage Eects and Consumer Welfare
In this section, we show how wage eects from mergers can be directly incorporated into merger evaluation even under a strict consumer welfare standard. The detailed set-up and derivations are left to Appendix D; here, we simply outline the framework and state the conditions required for a merger to be consumer welfare-improving. Consider an economy with two goods, the rst produced by the industry aected by the merger (hereafter the focal industry) and the second representing all other consumption (hereafter the numeraire industry). Denote the price of good i ∈ {1, 2} by p i . Denote the wage of consumers employed to produce good i by w i . Consumers have CobbDouglas utility over the two goods, U (x 1 , x 2 ) = x a 1 x b 2 , where x i is the consumer's consumption of good i, and a and b are parameters greater than zero. Consumers choose consumption of the two goods to maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint that their spending does not exceed their wage:
Suppose that the merger changes prices in the focal industry from p 1 to p 1 and wages from w 1 to w 1 . Abstracting away from possible general equilibrium eects, suppose further that prices and wages in the numeraire industry are unaected by the merger, and that the workers employed by each industry remain the same. What is the impact of such a merger on consumer welfare?
Using either compensating variation or equivalent variation to measure the welfare impact of the merger:
1. For consumers employed in the numeraire industry, the welfare impact of the merger depends solely on the merger's eect on prices. If p 1 < p 1 , then consumers employed in the numeraire industry are better o. If p 1 > p 1 , then they are worse o.
2. For consumers employed in the focal industry, the welfare impact of the merger depends both on the merger's eect on prices and its eect on wages. If
then consumers employed in the focal industry are better o. If
, then they are worse o.
In part 2 of the above results, a sucient condition for consumers employed in the focal industry being worse o is that the percentage decrease in wages post-merger is greater than the percentage decrease in prices: i.e., w 1 < w 1 and
. Therefore, consumers employed in the focal industry can be harmed by the merger even if prices fall. It follows that recognizing not only the eect of mergers on prices but also the eect on wages may raise the fraction of mergers that regulators oppose, even while remaining rmly anchored to a consumer welfare standard.
This framework highlights that, after explicitly considering the welfare of consumers employed in the industry aected by a merger, the impact of that merger on consumer welfare depends on both the change in the price of the good and the change in wages. The existing literature on mergers provides ample evidence on price eects (Borenstein 1990; Kim and Singal 1993; Prager and Hannan 1998) . Weinberg (2008) provides a helpful review. However, as further discussed in Section 3, there is scant evidence on the wage eects of mergers. If wages are unaected by mergers, then integrating wage eects into merger review will not aect enforcement decisions. If, on the other hand, mergerinduced labor market power depresses wage growth, then integrating wage eects may lead antitrust authorities to oppose a greater fraction of proposed mergers.
Related Literature
Although there is little direct evidence on the wage eects of mergers, there is evidence to suggest a link between employer concentration and wages. Recent work examining the relationship between employer concentration and wages nds a robust negative association: in aggregate, higher employer concentration is associated with lower wages (Azar et al. 2017; Benmelech et al. 2018; Rinz 2018 ).
This association holds across a range of data sources and specications. Benmelech et al. (2018) focus on manufacturing, and dene the geographic component of the labor market at the narrow level of a county. Azar et al. (2017) examine a variety of industries and occupations (dened by detailed six-digit SOC occupation codes) and dene the geographic component of the labor market at the broader level of a commuting zone. Rinz (2018) also utilizes the commuting zone, but denes industries using four-digit NAICS codes. The data used to construct measures of employer 6 concentration also vary across studies. Azar et al. (2017) compute vacancy concentration using recent job postings data from an online job board, whereas Benmelech et al. (2018) and Rinz (2018) utilize long panels of actual employment from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business Database.
Each of these studies reports a robust negative relationship between employer concentration and wages, despite the dierences in data sources and modeling choices.
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As discussed in the introduction, we contribute to this literature by directly examining the wage eects of mergers. Mergers induce well-measured, discontinuous increases in concentration whose cause we can pin down cleanly. Moreover, mergers are amenable to regulatory intervention under existing legislation. Our ndings suggest that the range of settings in which employer mergers meaningfully impact the labor market may be narrower than indicated by the aggregate analyses in recent papers. Nevertheless, in those settings where mergers have meaningful wage impacts, we nd that they are consistent with a labor market power mechanism.
More broadly, the paper connects to the literature documenting the presence and uses of employer market power. Dube et al. (2018) nd a surprising degree of employer power in seemingly competitive online markets for short-term labor. Jeers (2017) shows diminished labor mobility due to employer non-compete clauses. Krueger and Ashenfelter (2018) document wage suppression through non-poaching agreements within franchise rms.
The paper is also closely related to the literature on hospital market power and consolidation, which is a subject of active academic and policy debate (Gaynor and Town 2012; Gaynor 2018 ).
The market for hospital employment of nurses served as an early empirical setting for studying employer labor market power. Sullivan (1989) uses estimates of the rm-level elasticity of nursing labor supply to show that hospitals possessed labor market power in the 1980s. Staiger et al. (2010) leverage quasi-exogenous wage hikes in some hospitals to estimate the residual elasticity of nursing labor supply for competing hospitals, and conclude that hospitals have some labor market power.
5 Currie et al. (2005) use hospital mergers to examine the eects of system ownership on nursing employment, nding no wage eects but an increase in nurse eort. More recently, DePasquale 4 Direct comparisons of magnitudes across studies must account for the dierences in market denition, wage measures, and other empirical choices. Azar et al. (2017) estimate that increasing concentration from the 25th to 75th percentileroughly 6,000 HHI points in their datais associated with a wage reduction of 17 percent. Benmelech et al. (2018) estimate that a one standard deviation increase in concentrationroughly 3,500 HHI points in their datais associated with a wage reduction of 1 to 2 percent. Rinz (2018) estimates that increasing concentration from the median to the 75th percentile is associated with a wage reduction of about 10 percent.
5 The detailed nurse wage survey used in these papers was discontinued after 1992, prior to the start of our sample period.
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(2018) examines nearly three decades of hospital mergers and nds no impact on average hospital salaries. Notably, these papers do not distinguish between merger events based on the degree of consolidation induced by the merger. Our paper adds to this literature by examining the magnitude of merger-induced increases in local employer concentration and by distinguishing between workers with varying levels of skill and skill specicity.
Finally, our paper adds to a recent wave of papers that use retrospective merger analyses to shed light on frontier issues in antitrust economics. New insights from this growing literature advance the understanding of cross-market mergers (Dafny et al.; Lewis and Pum 2017) , merger-facilitated collusion (Miller and Weinberg 2017) , and the price eects of vertical mergers (Luco and Marshall 2018) . Like other papers in this literature, our analysis must confront the challenge of attributing the eects of mergers to a mechanismin this case, labor market power. Mergers may aect wages through other channels besides labor market power, such as changing the production technology of the merged entity. Such issues of attribution are not unusual in retrospective analyses of mergers, and our empirical strategy attempts to resolve them to the extent possible. Even with these caveats in place, the benets of examining actual mergers are substantial, generating both economic insights and guidance for antitrust regulators.
Data
This section briey describes the key sources of data used in the empirical analysis. Appendix A provides additional details and summary statistics. Our empirical context is the hospital industry, which is a tting context for studying the labor market eects of mergers. The industry is large, employing 5 million workers in 2018 BLS (2018a), and has a high rate of merger and acquisition activity. In addition, data on hospital wages are unusually comprehensive. We observe wages for essentially the universe of hospitals, measured separately for several worker categories with varying degrees of skill and skill specicity. HCRIS reports employment as total employee-hours worked, which we convert into FTEs by assuming a 40-hour work week. Since the cost reports occasionally vary in the length of time covered
by the report, we also adjust the calculation to ensure that dierences in reporting periods are not implicitly interpreted as dierences in employment.
9 We have also examined wage category-specic FTE measures, but the measures are highly correlated and do not yield meaningfully dierent insights.
Labor Market Denition. We dene the geographic component of the labor market at the level of a commuting zone. Commuting zones are geographically contiguous groups of counties between which residents commute to work, constructed based on Census commuting ow data. In the case of urban areas, the commuting zone typically encompasses the county containing the large metropolitan area as well as surrounding counties that share the same labor pool. There are 709 commuting zones in the latest denition based on the 2000 Census. Of these, 571 commuting zones have a general acute care hospital and are therefore in our sample. Azar et al. (2018) and Rinz (2018) also dene labor markets using commuting zones, whereas Benmelech et al. (2018) use individual counties. We use commuting zones to avoid overstating a local employer's labor market power in 9 Specically, hospital i's FTEs in year t are given by:
where CostReportDays it is the number of days covered by the cost report and TotalHoursit is the total number of hours worked, aggregating over all workers.
counties that have few employers but neighbor other counties with additional employers competing for labor. If the commuting zone understates the true breadth of the labor market, we will be less likely to detect an eect of mergers on wages. For antitrust authorities, determining the appropriate market denition in a merger case is an extremely fact-intensive process, often involving subpoenaed information (Gaynor and Pum 2017) . In the absence of another widely accepted denition of local labor markets, executing that process for the mergers in our data is not feasible, and hence we rely on the transparent but coarse denition of the commuting zone.
Measuring Concentration. We measure employer concentration using the Herndahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of FTEs within a commuting zone-year pair. In 1998, the median hospital is located in a commuting zone with an HHI of 2,134, growing to 2,665 by 2012. Importantly, this HHI measure captures concentration only among hospital employers. We use this as our primary measure of concentration because of the richness of our data for this set of employers, but note that this measure almost assuredly overstates the degree of eective employer concentration in the relevant labor market. Unskilled workers may be able to substitute to non-hospital employment in health care or to employment in other industries. The same may apply to skilled workers, albeit to a lesser extent. Nursing and pharmacy workers, who may be more constrained to health care jobs, may still be able to substitute to employment in non-hospital settings within the health care industry.
To better understand how hospital employment compares to overall health care employment, we compile data for a broader set of employers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW).
10 The QCEW reports establishment and employment counts at the county-industry level, which we then aggregate to the commuting zone. To calculate health care industry-wide employment, we subset to employment with NAICS codes beginning with 621
(ambulatory health care services, including but not limited to physician oces), 622 (hospitals), and 623 (nursing and residential care facilities). Because employment counts in the QCEW data are not broken out by employer, we cannot calculate an alternative HHI measure for the health care industry as a whole. However, since computing the change in HHI caused by a merger only requires the shares of the merging hospitals, 11 we can use the QCEW to measure how the mergers in our 10 A key advantage of the QCEW over the Census Bureau's County Business Patterns data, which has been used in the literature to measure labor market concentration, is that the QCEW includes government employers.
Approximately 20 percent of US hospitals are government-owned (KFF 2018), so accurate measurement of health care labor market concentration requires the inclusion of government employers.
11 The change in HHI resulting from the merger of rms A and B is 2 times A's share times B's share.
11
sample aect overall health care employer concentration.
Empirical Analysis
This section presents the main results of the paper. First, we document the association between hospital concentration and wages in the raw data. These aggregate analyses mirror recent papers that nd a negative relationship between employer concentration and wages (Azar et al. 2017; Benmelech et al. 2018; Rinz 2018) . Second, we estimate dierence-in-dierences models that examine the labor market eects of consolidation using only variation in concentration that is generated by merger activity. This approach has the dual benet of (i) relying on clear, well-dened shocks to concentration, and (ii) examining directly the policy lever that has been advanced as a leading potential labor market remedy. Third, we assess the extent to which strong labor unions attenuate any downward pressure on wages arising from mergers. Fourth, as a placebo test, we examine whether out-of-market mergers that do not aect local labor market concentration impact wage trajectories.
Discussion of several additional results is interspersed throughout the text.
Aggregate Analysis
In this section, we conrm that the hospital industry exhibits the same negative association between employer concentration and wages that has been documented in the recent literature. We regress wages on employer HHI for each of the three categories of workers dened in Section 4.1:
where wage imt is the log of wages for a given worker category in hospital i in year t and HHI m,t−1 is our measure of hospital employer concentration, lagged by one year.
12 The regressions include several important controls. Year xed eects (τ t ) are included to exibly control for national time trends in wages. We also include commuting zone xed eects (δ m ). Labor markets with one or a few dominant employers, such as factory towns, are disproportionately rural and therefore have low costs of living. The commuting zone xed eects condition out the negative correlation between concentration and wages that is explained by urban-rural dierences, as well as other persistent unobservable characteristics of commuting zones. The estimated relationship between 12 The results are similar using either further lags or contemporaneous HHI.
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employer HHI and wages is therefore measured from within-commuting zone variation in employer concentration. X imt contains a variety of additional market-level and hospital-level variables. To control for within-commuting zone changes in the cost of living, we include the log market rent for a one-bedroom apartment, measured from the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Fair
Market Rent data (HUD 2018). To roughly control for within-commuting zone changes in health care demand, we include the log of the commuting zone's population. To control for individual hospital characteristics that may aect wages, we include hospital size (measured by log bed count), the fractions of the hospital's inpatient discharges that come from Medicare and Medicaid, the complexity of the hospital's patient population (measured by log case mix index), and the hospital's inpatient vs. outpatient mix (measured by the fraction of hospital charges owing to outpatients).
Columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 1 report the results of these regressions, which cover the period of our ownership data (1998 to 2012). The point estimates are negative for all three worker categories, although the negative relationship is statistically signicant only for the skilled worker category.
Taking the point estimates at face value, wages in a market with an HHI of 5,000 are 2.4 percent lower for unskilled workers than in an otherwise observably similar perfectly competitive market, 8.1 percent lower for skilled workers, and 2.8 percent lower for nursing and pharmacy workers.
Omitting the additional controls can meaningfully aect the estimates. For instance, if we omit all of the additional controlsretaining only the commuting zone and year xed eectsthe point estimates for unskilled, skilled, and nursing and pharmacy wages are −0.059, −0.180, and −0.079, respectively, with all the estimates statistically signicant at the 10 percent level or better. All of these estimates are qualitatively similar to the negative employer concentration-wage relationship documented in the literature.
However, even given a rich set of controls, some of the measured relationship between concentration and wages in these aggregate regressions may be attributable to omitted variables aecting wages that are also correlated with concentration. For example, a negative economic shock may raise the probability of employer exit, thereby increasing HHI among the remaining employers, while simultaneously driving down wages. For antitrust policy, the most directly relevant metric is instead the relationship between wages and the portion of concentration that is attributable to mergers. We therefore isolate the portion of concentration that is attributable directly to employer consolidation through mergers by instrumenting for HHI using merger-induced changes in HHI. The instrument Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. All specications include commuting zone and year xed eects, plus the controls (log) one-bedroom rent, (log) population, (log) beds, (log) case mix index, % Medicare, % Medicaid, and % outpatient charges. Standard errors are clustered by hospital and observations are weighted by total inpatient discharges. For readability, the coecient estimates are scaled so that they reect the eect of HHI when HHI is measured on a scale between zero and one. The instrument is merger-induced concentration changes.
varies by commuting zone and year and measures the cumulative merger-induced change in HHI in the commuting zone from the start of the sample period.
13 Merger-induced changes in HHI are highly predictive of total changes in HHI: the rst-stage coecient on merger-induced HHI is 1.01, with a rst-stage F-statistic of 854.
Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 1 report the results of the IV regressions. The estimates foreshadow our ndings from the dierence-in-dierences analysis in Section 5. For the unskilled worker category, the relationship between instrumented employer concentration and wages remains negative and insignicant, and the magnitude of the point estimate is smaller than the OLS estimate. For the skilled worker category, the estimate remains negative and highly statistically signicant. For the nursing and pharmacy category, the magnitude of the point estimate more than doubles and becomes statistically signicant at the 5 percent level. These dierences between the OLS and IV estimates highlight the fact that aggregate regressions of wages on concentration are identied from a variety of factors besides employer consolidation. The raw variation in concentration may be a result of organic employer growth, local economic shocks, rm exit, or other factors that may also aect wages. Since antitrust authorities seeking to address the purported link between concentra-13 The commuting zone xed eects absorb the dierences between commuting zones in initial HHI at the start of the sample period.
tion and wages can act primarily on mergers, such regressions cannot serve as a complete basis for antitrust policy. We therefore turn next to a retrospective evaluation of mergers' eects on wages.
Dierence-in-Dierences Analysis
In this section, we examine the labor market eects of consolidation using only variation in concentration that is induced by merger activity. We use dierence-in-dierences models to estimate wage trajectories following well-dened merger events. This event study approach allows us to examine the relationship between employer consolidation and wages found in Table 1 in greater detail, including checking for dierential pre-trends in wages prior to observed merger events.
Merger Sample and Control Group
We focus on commuting zones that experienced a single instance of a merger-induced increase in concentration between 2000 and 2010. We restrict the sample to the years 2000 and 2010 so that we have at least four years of pre-and post-merger wage data for all mergers in the sample. There are 84 such cases. Because of the prevalence of consolidation in the industry, many commuting zones experience concentration-increasing mergers in multiple years. In these cases, it is less clear how to dene the pre-and post-periods for the dierence-in-dierences analysis, and there are greater concerns about unobservables driving widespread merger activity also aecting wage trends. in concentration is small: on average, a 63 point increase in HHI for hospital employment and a mere 11 point increase for overall health care employment. While the second and third quartiles of mergers involve more meaningful changes in concentration when considering only hospital employment (average increases of 200 points or more), the eect of these mergers on concentration remains modest when considering overall health care employment (average increases around 100 points or less). Only in the top quartile do the mergers involve substantial increases in concentration both for a hospital-only labor market denition and an overall health care labor market denition.
Since an increase in labor market power may aect wage-setting at all rms within the market, the treatment group includes both those hospitals that are directly involved in a merger event and also the other hospitals in that commuting zone. There are 569 hospitals in the 84 treated commuting zones. Of these, 30 percent of treated hospitals are directly involved in the merger events under examination, while the other 70 percent are bystanders to those mergers (i.e., they compete in the same market). In the results below, we also discuss the estimates from specications that separately estimate wage eects by the hospital's involvement in the merger.
We dene the control group as hospitals in commuting zones without any merger activity between 15 Further discussion of the alternative control groups and the corresponding 15 Specically, we include hospitals in commuting zones with merger activity that did not aect labor market concentration: that is, out-of-market mergers. We do not include these markets in our main control group because out-of-market mergers may aect wages through mechanisms other than labor market power (we examine these eects regression results, which do not meaningfully impact the interpretation of the estimates presented here, is contained in Appendix B.
Regression Specication and Results
To measure the eect of mergers on wages, we estimate:
We estimate the model separately for each of the three worker categories. The variable of interest is post mt , which is an indicator for whether and when commuting zone m is treated: i.e., experienced a within-market hospital merger in year t ≤ t. As is standard, the model includes hospital and year xed eects, and thus the eect of mergers is identied by within-hospital changes in wages following a merger event, exibly controlling for nationwide wage trends. X imt contains the same market-level and hospital-level variables as the aggregate regressions in Section 5.1. For hospitals in the treatment group, we subset the data to the four years preceding and the four years following the merger event in order to focus on wage trends immediately surrounding the merger. The year of the merger is excluded from the regressions, since mergers generally happen during a calendar year and the year of acquisition belongs partially in the pre-period and partially in the post-period. We cluster the standard errors at the hospital level and weight observations by the hospital's inpatient discharge volume.
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The top panel of Table 3 (columns 1 to 3) presents the estimates of equation (2). Each column reports the dierence-in-dierences estimate for the corresponding worker category. When pooling all mergers together, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that consolidation has zero eect on wages. The estimates are statistically insignicant and the magnitudes of the point estimates are small, indicating merger eects of less than one percent. Despite the overall negative relationship between concentration and wages seen in Section 5.1, the null results in the top panel of Table 3 are arguably unsurprising. The median labor market experiencing a hospital merger sees its health care employer concentration rise by only 59 HHI points. This HHI increase is analogous to a merger of two employers in a market that initially has eighteen employers with equal labor market shares.
directly in Section 5.4). Expanding the control group to include commuting zones with out-of-market mergers nearly doubles the size of the control group. We also use the expanded control group to construct a matched control group based on hospital and market characteristics.
16 Unweighted specications yield largely similar but somewhat noisier estimates. The bottom panel of Table 3 (columns 4 to 6) reports the results from specications that estimate separate merger eects by the increase in concentration induced by the merger. As described earlier (Table 2) , only mergers in the top quartile represent substantial changes in overall health care employer concentration according to standard benchmarks. For the bottom three quartiles of mergers, the dierence-in-dierences estimate is statistically insignicant and generally small in magnitude for all three worker categories. That is, we cannot reject that wage growth rates remain the same following mergers in the bottom three quartiles. We nd statistically signicant wage eects only for mergers in the top quartile of ∆HHI. For the skilled worker category, we estimate that nominal wages are 4.1 percent lower over the four years following the merger than they would have been absent the merger. For the nursing and pharmacy worker category, we estimate that nominal wages are 6.3 percent lower.
17 In terms of wage growth, these estimates imply that postmerger annual wage growth (measured over the four years following the merger) is 1.1 percentage points slower for skilled workers and 1.7 percentage points slower for nursing and pharmacy workers than would be expected absent the merger. Average annual nominal wage growth, as indicated by the year xed eects estimates and the summary statistics in Section 4.1, ranges from 3 to 4 percent.
The estimates for mergers in the top quartile of ∆HHI therefore represent substantial slowdowns in wage growth.
On balance, these results suggest that for employer consolidation to put downward pressure on wages, a substantial increase in concentration is required. The results also highlight the importance of an appropriate labor market denition. We nd signicant eects only for the skilled worker category and the nursing and pharmacy worker category, both of which require relatively industryspecic human capital. The unskilled category consists of workers with less industry-specic human capital, such as cafeteria workers. It is therefore likely that the relevant employer concentration for this category does not rise by nearly as much as our hospital and health care HHI measures would suggest. Of course, we cannot rule out that meaningful employer consolidation on a broader scale would have negative wage eects for these workers.
Wage Trends Prior to Mergers
The above dierence-in-dierences estimates will yield a biased estimate of the causal eect of mergers if the error term in equation (2) is correlated with mergers. This would be the case if, for example, acquirers strategically seek out target hospitals that are projected to have lower labor cost growth in the future. While we cannot rule out such anticipatory acquisitions, we can check for dierential wage trends between treatment and control hospitals in the years leading up to a merger. Figure 2 plots the coecients from regressions that mirror the top panel of Table 3 , but which replace the single post mt indicator with lead indicators for the four years leading up to a merger and lag indicators for the four years following a merger. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of common wage trends pre-merger, and all of the lag indicators' 95 percent condence intervals include zero.
We also check for dierential wage pre-trends for mergers in the top quartile of ∆HHI ( Figure   17 Exponentiating the coecients for interpretation, exp(−0.042) − 1 = −0.041 and exp(−0.065) − 1 = −0.063. The gure plots coecients for lead and lag indicators up to four years prior to or following a merger, from a regression where these indicators replace the single Post variable in the top panel of Table 3 . Four years before the merger is the omitted category. Vertical bars represent 95 percent condence intervals. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no dierence in pre-trends in wages between the treatment and control groups for any of the worker categories. The gure plots coecients for lead and lag indicators up to four years prior to or following a merger, from a regression where these indicators replace the single Post variable in the bottom panel Table 3 . Four years before the merger is the omitted category. Vertical bars represent 95 percent condence intervals. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no dierence in pre-trends in wages between the treatment and control groups for the skilled category and the nursing and pharmacy category. For the unskilled category, wages grow slower among treatment hospitals than among control hospitals leading up to the mergers, but there is no evidence of a dierence following the mergers.
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3). We do not detect dierential pre-trends for the skilled category or the nursing and pharmacy category, though the leads and lags are less precisely estimated for the skilled category. For the unskilled category, wages grow slower among treatment hospitals than control hospitals leading up to the merger, but there is no evidence of a dierence post-merger. The slowdown in nursing and pharmacy wages following a merger is persistent, continuing at least four years after the merger event. Skilled wages, on the other hand, grow slower than in control markets in the two years immediately following the merger, but subsequently appear to recover.
Output Quantity, Labor Quantity/Composition, and Eects by Merger Involvement A remaining challenge in interpreting these results as evidence of labor market power is that mergers may aect wages through several other channels. While only observing wage eects after a large increase in concentration and only for employees with an industry-specic skillset is highly consistent with a labor market power story, we conduct several additional analyses to examine other possible mechanisms. We briey summarize the results of those analyses here; Appendix C contains regression results and further discussion.
One possibility is that any post-merger wage eects are merely an extension of increased market power in the output market. Consider the textbook case of monopoly, in which there is a contraction in output quantity relative to the competitive level. Producing that reduced quantity may require less labor, and hence there is a fall in labor demand coincident with a merger. Such a fall in labor demand could place downward pressure on wages, even absent any change in labor market power.
18 We examine this possibility directly by estimating dierence-in-dierences models with various measures of output quantity (e.g., inpatient discharges) and labor quantity (FTEs for each of the three wage categories) as outcome variables. We do not nd evidence of systematic reductions in output quantity nor labor quantity following mergers of any size (Table C.1) . Thus, a reduction in labor demand does not appear to explain the documented wage slowdowns following mergers in the top quartile of ∆HHI.
Another possibility is that there is a post-merger shift in the composition of the workforce. For instance, even holding the quantity of skilled workers constant, there could be a post-merger shift toward lower-skilled workers within the skilled category. In that case, the observed wage eects may simply reect a change in the composition of the workforce rather than any eects of labor market power per se. In the absence of worker-level data, we cannot directly test whether the observed wage slowdowns are driven by within-worker wage changes. Instead, we check for shifts in labor composition for a subset of workers where we can observe ner subcategories: nurses. Unlike the HCRIS data from which we measure wages, the AHA data report separate employment gures for two subclasses of nurses: registered nurses (RNs) and licensed practical nurses (LPNs). RNs require more years of training, have more stringent licensing requirements, and earn an average salary of approximately 1.5 times that of LPNs (BLS 2018b). Dierence-in-dierences models with RN FTEs, LPN FTEs, and the percent of nurse FTEs that are LPNs as outcome variables do not indicate a shift toward lower-compensated nurses (Table C. 2). While this test does not support a shift in labor composition as the cause of the observed wage eects, we again emphasize that our ability to rmly test that possibility is hindered by our lack of worker-level data.
We also explore variation in the estimated wage slowdowns following mergers in the top quartile of ∆HHI (the only case where we detect statistically signicant wage eects) as a function of the hospital's involvement in the merger. To do so, we estimate separate merger eects for (i) the hospital(s) belonging to the acquiring system, (ii) the hospital(s) acquired in the transaction, and (iii) the non-merging hospitals in the same market. For the nursing and pharmacy worker category, wage slowdowns are very similar for both merging and non-merging hospitals in the same market:
the estimates are all negative and similar in magnitude for acquirers, targets, and their non-merging rivals (Table C. 3). For the skilled worker category, on the other hand, the baseline estimated eect appears to be driven by the merging hospitals: the estimates are negative and statistically signicant both for acquirer and target hospitals, but statistically indistinguishable from zero for non-merging hospitals in the same market.
Labor Unions
If the wage slowdowns documented in Section 5.2 can indeed be traced to post-merger increases in employer labor market power, then strong worker power may act as a countervailing force. This section therefore tests for mitigating eects of strong labor unions. We focus on the nursing and pharmacy worker category, as this is the only category for which we can construct a measure of the employee unionization rate. In addition to the unionization rate, we also examine state-level right-to-work laws. Right-to-work laws prohibit unions from collecting dues from workers whom they represent, but who are not members of the union. Unions in right-to-work states are therefore thought to have less power in wage negotiations with employers.
We calculate state-by-year nurse unionization rates from the Current Population Survey, using respondents whose primary occupation is nursing.
19 Of course, unionization rates may be endogenously determined partially as a function of employer market power. For our purposes, however, it suces to check whether union power at the time of the merger impacts the subsequent wage trajectory. We incorporate nurse unionization rates into the regression specications by interacting the post-by-∆HHI quartile variables with the nurse unionization rate (and including the unionization rate as a standalone variable). The results are depicted in the top panel of Figure 4 . In the gure, we evaluate the estimated eect of mergers on wages both at a low level of nurse unionization The bottom panel of Figure 4 conducts an analogous exercise, now using the presence of state right-to-work laws as the measure of union power (NRWTC 2018). If union power is an eective moderator of employer wage-setting power following a merger, then wage slowdowns will likely be larger in labor markets with right-to-work laws, which weaken unions even conditional on unionization rates. The results are similar to the specication examining nurse unionization rates. For mergers in the top quartile of ∆HHI, the estimated post-merger reductions in wage growth appear only after mergers in right-to-work states. We view these results as bolstering the interpretation of the merger eects in Section 5.2 as consequences of increased labor market powerpower that can potentially be mitigated by strong labor unions.
19 While ideally we would be able to measure unionization at the hospital level, we are not aware of any comprehensive data source containing that information. Moreover, unionization rates are capable of aecting wages not only at unionized employers, but also at competing employers through the union threat eect: the threat that employees will unionize or quit if working conditions fall too far below those oered by the unionized employers (Rosen 1969) . 
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For these out-of-market mergers, any observed wage eects presumably operate through channels besides reduced competition for labor. If mechanisms besides labor market power play the dominant role in generating the post-merger wage eects documented above, then meaningful wage eects should also be observed following out-of-market mergers.
21 Examining out-of-market mergers therefore gives us the opportunity to rule out labor market power as the dominant mechanism, even if it does not give us the opportunity to conrm it. To examine the eect of out-of-market mergers, we estimate dierence-in-dierences models comparing wage trends in commuting zones with out-of-market mergers to commuting zones without any merger activity (the same control group as the analysis in Section 5.2). Analogous to the main analysis, we restrict the sample of treated commuting zones to those that experienced a single out-of-market merger during the 2000 to 2010 period, leaving 90 commuting zones. The top panel of Table 4 reports estimates from a regression mirroring equation (2), but with the treatment group now dened as hospitals in markets experiencing an out-of-market merger. We do not nd evidence of post-merger wage eects: the estimates are small and statistically insignicant for all three worker categories. The bottom panel breaks out the eects by the quartile of hospital HHI at the time of the merger.
22 While the point 20 We cannot directly rule out that the relevant geographic labor markets for hospital workers are broader than a commuting zone. However, if there were no migration frictions at all, then we should not see any wage slowdowns following mergers within local labor markets, as we do in our baseline results.
21 A similar approach is used by Focarelli and Panetta (2003) to distinguish between eciency and market power eects of bank mergers.
22 This is in contrast to the bottom panel of Table 3 , which breaks out the eects by the quartile of the change in HHI induced by the merger. In the case of out-of-market mergers, there is no merger-induced change in HHI. Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. All specications include hospital and year xed eects, plus the controls (log) one-bedroom rent, (log) population, (log) beds, (log) case mix index, % Medicare, % Medicaid, and % outpatient charges. Standard errors are clustered by hospital and observations are weighted by total inpatient discharges. The bottom row reports the p-value of a test of the null hypothesis that the post×HHI quartile eects are equal to one another.
estimates occasionally increase in magnitude, they remain small compared to our baseline estimates and are statistically insignicant in every case. Even in extremely concentrated marketsthe top quartile is almost exclusively monopoly marketswe do not nd clear evidence of reduced wage growth post-merger.
If mergers aect equilibrium wages through changes in managerial know-how or other changes to rm production functions that are not directly related to labor market power, then we would expect wage trajectories following out-of-market mergers to diverge from trajectories in markets without mergers. That we nd no evidence of such divergence suggests that either the results for concentration-increasing mergers are attributable to labor market power, or that the non-labor market power changes following concentration-increasing mergers dier from the changes following concentration-preserving mergers. This could be the case if, for example, mergers of nearby hospitals allow for a more ecient allocation of workers across locations whereas out-of-market mergers do not. While we cannot rule out that out-of-market mergers aect other determinants of wages dierently than within-market mergers, these results suggest that the wage eects we observe for within-market mergers likely cannot be explained without allowing for some eect of labor market power.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the wage impacts of employer consolidation in the hospital industry by examining wage trajectories following hospital mergers. We nd evidence of wage slowdowns, but only following mergers that induce large increases in employer concentration, and only for workers whose skills are somewhat industry-specic. Where we do nd wage slowdowns, we present evidence consistent with an employer labor market power mechanism. On balance, our results suggest that increased labor market power following mergers can reduce wage growth, but that such eects may apply in narrower circumstances than suggested by aggregate estimates of the relationship between concentration and wages. Policy-makers and antitrust regulators are actively debating whether labor market eects should be incorporated into merger review. The conceptual framework laid out in Section 2 demonstrates that doing so does not necessarily require a departure from consumer welfare as the main standard by which mergers are evaluated.
Consistent with current approaches to evaluating output market eects of mergers, our empirical results imply that the use of merger review to restrain consolidation on the basis of labor market eects should be sensitive to the specics of the merger. Our results indicate that likely wage eects may vary substantially by worker type, in ways consistent with theory. Just as antitrust authorities consider multiple product markets aected by a single proposed merger, each merger may involve multiple relevant labor markets. In the hospital context, even very large mergers do not appear to aect wages for workers whose skills are not specic to the health care industry. Our ndings thus also highlight that employer consolidation is a policy concern that extends beyond the low-skilled 23 In addition to out-of-market mergers, we also check for changes in the production functions of the main treatment hospitals by estimating dierence-in-dierences models with non-wage hospital operating costs as the outcome variable. We calculate non-wage hospital operating costs from the HCRIS data by taking total costs and subtracting total wages and capital related costs. We do not detect any evidence of post-merger changes in non-wage hospital operating costs: the dierence-in-dierences estimates are small and statistically insignicant.
and low-wage workers who have been a focus of recent policy discussions (Krueger and Posner 2018; Krueger and Ashenfelter 2018) . On the contrary, high-skilled workers in some industries likely face a smaller eective set of employers than lower-skilled workers whose skills are less industry-specic.
One characteristic of the hospital setting that may not generalize to other industries is that any merger that generates scrutiny due to labor market concentration eects is likely to get agged on the basis of existing product market merger review guidelines. Health care workers' willingness to travel for work likely exceeds patients' willingness to travel for health care. Similarly, health care workers can likely more easily substitute to non-hospital employment than many patients can substitute to non-hospital care. Both of these features will typically make the merging hospitals a smaller part of the relevant labor market than the relevant output market. Thus, the initial scrutiny stage may generally be unaected by adding labor market considerations to merger review.
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In other industries, such as software development, output markets are less geographically localized, so mergers that could have large local labor market eects may fail to invite scrutiny based on output market-focused merger review practices.
24 Note, however, that it is possible to construct examples in which considering a broader market denition would increase antitrust scrutiny. For example, consider the merger of two hospitals on opposite ends of a major city.
Depending on patient and worker preferences, it is possible that patient substitution between the two hospitals is weak whereas worker substitution is strong. In such a situation, the merger may be expected to have greater labor market eects than output market eects. The HCRIS data include extensive information about hospital operations and nances. Wage information is contained in Worksheet S-3, Part II. We begin by restricting the data to general acute care hospitalsexcluding specialty hospitals, such as dedicated pediatric hospitals and cancer centersthat are never designated as critical access hospitals. We do not have merger data for nongeneral acute care hospitals, and wage data are not available for critical access hospitals. We aggregate workers into three broad categories, motivated by the institutional details of the hospital industry and the structure of the HCRIS data. HCRIS reports total wages and hours worked for approximately 40 separate line items, each of which is a fairly narrowly dened class of workers. We aggregate these line items into three broad categories of workers based on the line item description and the observed wages for each line item, grouping together line items with similar wages and similar degrees of skill specicity.
We dene the wage for unskilled workers as the average across the Maintenance & Repairs, In the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, markets with an HHI below 1,500 are classied as unconcentrated; between 1,500 and 2,500, moderately concentrated; and above 2,500, highly concentrated.
B Alternative Control Groups
This section provides further discussion of observable dierences between hospitals in the treatment and control groups, along with regression results from specications that modify the control group. Table B .1 reports summary statistics for the treatment and control groups prior to the mergers under examination. As explained in the main text, our preferred specication denes the control group as hospitals in commuting zones that do not experience any mergers over the course of our sample period (column No Acq. in Table B .1). Hospitals in this control group are on average smaller than hospitals in the treatment group, and exhibit a dierent geographic distribution across the US.
We also repeat our main regressions with two alternate denitions of the control group. First, we expand the control group to also include commuting zones that experienced only out-of-market mergers (column Expanded in Table B .1). This addition nearly doubles the size of the control group. Second, we use the expanded control group to construct a set of more restrictive matched controls based on the observables in Table B .1: hospital-specic characteristics like wage levels and discharge volume, market-specic characteristics like population, and Census division. Specically, we use 1-to-1 optimal matching using Mahalanobis distance as the distance metric. The matched controls regressions compare wage changes among hospitals aected by a concentration-increasing merger event to wage changes among observably similar hospitals that are unaected by mergers. This approach mitigates any dierences in wage trends that are attributable to selection on observables into merger events.
Regression results for the pooled dierence-in-dierences specication with the alternate control groups are reported in Table B .2. Columns 1 to 3 copy the results from Table 3 in the main text.
We are unable to reject the null hypothesis of zero wage eects with any of the control groups, and the point estimates remain extremely similar. Specications broken out by quartiles of ∆HHI are reported in Table B .3. Columns 1 to 3 again copy the results from Table 3 in the main text.
Both the qualitative patterns and the magnitude and signicance of the coecients are very similar across the control groups. We estimate statistically signicant negative wage eects only following mergers in the top quartile of ∆HHI, and only for the skilled and nursing and pharmacy worker categories. This section further explains the secondary analyses described on page 23. We discuss output quantity responses, labor quantity and composition, and wage trajectories separated by involvement in the merger.
Output Quantity and Labor Demand
Our main resultsnegative wage eects for workers with industry-specic skills following mergers generating large increases in concentrationare potentially consistent with reductions in labor demand resulting from increased power in the output market, under which an employer may rationally reduce production. To explore this possibility, we examine the trajectory of output and labor quantity following mergers. Output quantity is measured by hospital discharges. Labor quantity, which is our best available proxy for labor demand, is measured by worker FTEs.
The rst two columns of Table C .1 report the results of dierence-in-dierences regressions mirroring our primary specication, but using measures of patient volume as the outcome variable.
Column 1 uses the count of inpatient discharges. Column 2 adjusts the discharge counts for outpatient activity at the hospital. There is no evidence of output quantity reductions following mergers of any size. The estimates are positive and never statistically signicant. These results do not provide support for the argument that post-merger wage slowdowns are driven by output quantity reductions, although the estimates are not suciently precise to rule out that possibility.
25
Irrespective of output quantity changes, wages may decrease in markets with mergers due to a movement down the labor demand curve for other reasons. Columns 3 to 5 of Table C .1 therefore check for dierential trends in total employment within each of the three worker categories following mergers. We fail to reject zero employment eects for the unskilled and skilled worker categories. For the nursing and pharmacy category, there is some evidence of faster employment growth following mergers in the top quartile of ∆HHI. These patterns suggest that a labor demand reduction is unlikely to explain the documented wage slowdowns following mergers in the top quartile of ∆HHI.
Instead, we interpret our results as being consistent with a model of the labor market in which 25 We retain the discharge weights in these specications for consistency. The unweighted estimates are very similar. Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. All outcome variables are logged, and hence the estimates can be interpreted as percent changes. Adjusted discharges, which captures outpatient activity at the hospital, is dened as inpatient discharges times the ratio of total charges to inpatient charges. All specications include hospital and year xed eects, plus the controls (log) one-bedroom rent, (log) population, (log) beds, (log) case mix index, % Medicare, % Medicaid, and % outpatient charges. Standard errors are clustered by hospital and observations are weighted by total inpatient discharges.
frictions arise due to search costs or increasing costs (to workers) of generating competing oers following employer consolidation.
Labor Composition
Our ndings of slower wage growth but no signicant evidence of quantity reductions following large increases in concentration may be explained by slowing within-worker wage growth, or by a shift in labor composition toward lower-compensated workers within a worker category. Without workerlevel data, we are somewhat constrained in our ability to speak to these possibilities. As discussed in the main text, we do check whether there are any post-merger shifts toward licensed practical nurses (LPNs) and away from registered nurses (RNs). The AHA data report separate employment gures for these two subclasses of nurses. RNs are more highly trained and compensated than LPNs. Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. All specications include hospital and year xed eects, plus the controls (log) one-bedroom rent, (log) population, (log) beds, (log) case mix index, % Medicare, % Medicaid, and % outpatient charges. Standard errors are clustered by hospital and observations are weighted by total inpatient discharges.
estimated to increase more than LPN employment, and the fraction of LPNs is estimated to decrease. Given the imprecision of the estimates and our inability to examine worker-level outcomes, it is dicult to draw denitive conclusions about possible shifts in labor composition. We view this as a natural area for future research.
Eects by Merger Involvement
Our baseline results (Table 3) do not distinguish between the merging hospitals and the non-merging hospitals in the same commuting zone, instead conserving statistical power by measuring wage patterns across all hospitals within each labor market. Table C .3 reports the results of dierencein-dierences regressions that estimate separate post-merger eects for acquiring hospitals, target hospitals, and non-merging hospitals in the same market. For parsimony, we report results only for the cases where we observe wage eects: mergers in the top quartile of ∆HHI and skilled and nursing and pharmacy workers.
For the skilled worker category, the eects are similar for acquirer and target hospitals. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no wage eect for their non-merging rivals. Moreover, we can reject the null hypothesis of equal eects at the 5 percent level. For the nursing and pharmacy category, the estimates are similar in magnitude for all three groups of hospitals. The estimate for one-bedroom rent, (log) population, (log) beds, (log) case mix index, % Medicare, % Medicaid, and % outpatient charges. Standard errors are clustered by hospital and observations are weighted by total inpatient discharges. The bottom two rows report the p-value of a test of the null hypothesis that (i) the acquirer and target eects are equal to one another, and (ii) the acquirer, target, and non-merging rival eects are equal to one another.
target hospitals is not statistically signicant, but the point estimate is the largest of the three.
By construction, these specications have less statistical power than our baseline results, so it is unsurprising that the estimates are less precise.
D Mergers and Consumer Welfare
This section further describes the modied consumer welfare framework discussed in Section 2.
We derive the welfare comparisons using both compensating variation and equivalent variation.
The economy has two goods, the rst produced by the industry aected by the merger (the focal industry) and the second representing all other consumption (the numeraire industry). Denote the price of the rst good by p 1 and the price of the second good by p 2 . Denote the wage of consumers employed in the focal industry by w 1 and the wage of consumers employed in the numeraire industry by w 2 . Consumers have Cobb-Douglas utility over the two goods, U (x 1 , x 2 ) = x a 1 x b 2 , where x 1 is the consumer's consumption of the rst good, x 2 is the consumer's consumption of the second good, and a and b are parameters greater than zero. Consumers choose consumption to maximize their one-period utility subject to the budget constraint that their spending does not exceed their
